

# The Difference Between The Reformed And The Lutheran Interpretation Of The So-Called Third Use Of The Law

[This article appeared originally in German in the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1916), pp 120-133. For the translation we are indebted to Prof. Richard W. Strobel of Northwestern College, Watertown, Wisconsin. Prof. Pieper taught at Wisconsin Lutheran Seminary for 39 years, from 1902 to 1941.]

*By August Pieper*

Previously in this *Quarterly* in the article "The Law Is Not Made for a Righteous Man" we attempted to establish that for the righteous person, for the Christian *as such*, no law *per se* applies anymore in any way, neither as doctrine, nor as requirement, nor as curse.<sup>i</sup> This includes also *the* law, the law of God from Sinai. In so far as the Christian still has his sinful flesh, however, the law - precisely, the law from Sinai - still applies to him in each and every way.

As in all of our work of this kind, we operated, as a matter of principle, only with Scripture itself, without bringing in human testimony. There was one exception: we did refer to our Confessions, especially the Formula of Concord, which *ex professo* treats of this subject in a special article.

The aforementioned article brought several letters that heartily agreed with us, but also one that did not agree, and one that expressed hesitation regarding a main point. We may therefore take for granted that interest in the subject we have treated is quite general; and since the correct understanding of the nature and use of the law is of such great significance for our personal life of faith and our entire pastoral activity, we were already occupied with the preparation of an additional essay on the same subject when we found in the literature consulted for this purpose a discussion of the matter in Max Schneckenburger's classic *A Comparative Presentation of the Lutheran and Reformed Concept of Doctrine*.<sup>ii</sup> This not only endorses our presentation in all points but also shows irrefutably from the sources on both sides that it is the genuinely Lutheran one in opposition to the Reformed view.

Since Schneckenburger's book will be accessible to only a few, we are laying our work aside and are printing the pertinent passage here unchanged, omitting only some unessential material, in the certainty that we are thereby rendering the great majority of our readers a service and no small joy. We have translated the longer Latin quotations, and where we thought it helpful, we have added a few notes.

First, however, some remarks regarding Schneckenburger himself. He died in 1848 at the age of 44. A Swabian, he studied theology at Tuebingen under Johann Christian Friedrich Stendel, Christian Friedrich Schmid and the well-known Ferdinand Christian Baur. He continued his theological studies in Berlin under Schleiermacher, Neander and Marheinecke. In 1827 he became a tutor at the theological seminary of Tuebingen and in 1834 theological professor at the University of Bern, which had been expanded from an academy to a university. A pious Christian like his parents, as a theologian he was thoroughly positive and Lutheran, even if he was little inclined to emphasize Lutheranism, as was to be expected in that age of radical political and intellectual change. In Switzerland he got to know the Reformed spirit at its source and devoted most of the scholarly activity of his short life to trying to understand thoroughly the difference between the Lutheran and Reformed doctrinal presentation from the confessions, catechisms, liturgies and, above all, from the writings of the founders and dogmaticians of both churches.

The result of these labors is found in the above-mentioned book. He himself was not able to have it published. He was one of those who cannot decide to publish a book because they think they still have much to polish and improve as to the form. Thus he died, leaving behind nothing but the completely finished lecture-manuscripts. One of his grateful students, Pastor Edward Gueder in Biel, prepared the manuscripts for publication after comparing them with several books of notes taken from his lectures. The book was published by the Metzler Publishing House in Stuttgart in 1855 and is rightly regarded as a theological classic. No

Lutheran pastor who is somewhat concerned to plumb the genuinely Christian-Lutheran spirit and its Reformed counterpart would want to be without this book, once he has become acquainted with it.

A knowledge of the difference between the Lutheran and Reformed spirit is nowhere more necessary than in this country, where the Reformed spirit completely controls the life of the church and to a great extent also that of the state. Many do not realize how much of the Reformed spirit has penetrated our Lutheran church in this country. With regard to the stated theme Schneckengerber writes:

When in the Lutheran Church...the one-sided antinomian movement, which wanted to have the preaching of the law banned from the church as not at all applying to Christians and being harmful to true faith, was brought back onto the right track by Luther, the doctrinal designation of a threefold use of the law, as the Formula of Concord has it, appeared: *usus politicus* [the curb function], *usus elenchticus* or *paedeuticus* [the mirror function] and *usus normativus* [the guide function]. The last, also called *usus tertius*, concerns believing regenerated Christians. The law contains the norm according to which believing Christians are to regulate their lives.

In general, the Reformed teach the same. They too had to combat various types of antinomianism which developed in their midst, even though it was derived in part from other sources. When they talk about the enduring authority of the law, however, they mean something different from what Lutherans mean. If we take a closer look at how Lutherans think of this enduring authority, then it cannot consist in this that the law maintains its compelling and demanding authority over believers. For just as Christ redeemed us from the curse, so he also redeemed us from the compelling demands of the law in that he did everything which the law demands of us. Consequently, the believer as such consciously knows that by virtue of his justification he has been liberated from both aspects of the law, from its curse (*maledictio*) and its coercion (*coactio*).

It is therefore completely in keeping with the Lutheran point of view when Philippi in his book about the active obedience of Christ says that the one who has been justified is always conscious of freedom from both the punishment and the demands of the law, from the curse and the coercion of the law.<sup>iii</sup> This is the same as saying that both forgiveness of sins and justification have been equally granted to him. The believer, as a person who has been justified, is no longer under the law. The law does not have to urge him on to anything anymore; it has nothing to demand of him anymore because its demands have been fulfilled by Christ. What motivates the Christian is love, which has its origin in faith and is the fruition of that faith, in short, the Holy Spirit. Faith, which by the grace of God is saturated with love, compels the believer of himself to do that which is good.<sup>iv</sup>

If, however, the law is still to be a norm for him to which he knows he is subject, to the observance of which he knows he is obligated, to whose command he knows he is bound, then this can happen only in so far as he has yet another side than that according to which he possesses the conviction of his justification, and in faith through the Holy Spirit also possesses the immanent principle of conduct well-pleasing to God. That is, the law applies as law *only to the Old Man, who is still always present*, to the sinful part of the believer, which has not yet been overcome and assimilated by the Spirit.

Gerhard expresses this as follows:

The regenerate Christian, in so far as he is a Christian and regenerated, needs no law, namely, that drives and compels him, because he does good works on his own initiative. Since, however, he is not yet completely regenerated but is still partly under the old domination of the flesh, his stubborn flesh must be compelled by commands and threats and subjected to the rule of the spirit.<sup>v</sup>

Luther had already made essentially this same point against Agricola. So this *teritus usus legis* or *normativus* is very closely related to the *paedeuticus* in that it has reference only to sin, to its subjection and elimination. *Only sin, which is still continually present, makes such a positive norm necessary.*

*Reformed doctrine too is acquainted with this purposely negative use of the law..* It likewise had reason to remind the antinomians that the believer and regenerate Christian is not yet perfect or free from everything sinful. But this significance of the law and the believer's need for it is still not the complete statement of Reformed doctrine. It is merely the subordinate aspect of it. The law has a *positive* significance for the regenerate person *as* such, not just a negative one, in so far as he still has a side that has not yet been renewed. It must tell him what he as a believer and regenerate person must do. It must *prescribe* God's will to him and *encourage* him to carry it out. Accordingly, *the justified and regenerated person as such* needs the law, and for this reason that, as we have seen before, he has to do good works and in doing the same has to work out his salvation.

The law is the rule of good works, as Pictet teaches:

[To be sure, the law] no longer has that use which it would have had in the state of innocence, where it would have been the means to obtain eternal life [this, by the way, is also a specifically Reformed idea of which the Scriptures say not a word—A.P.], also with reference to justification. For believers are no longer under the *curse* of the law, but *the law is not abolished; it is always the most perfect rule for morals*. Christ and the apostles recommend the law, and without sanctification no one will see the face of God.<sup>vi</sup>

The *Geneva Catechism* states: "Why then are there so many admonitions, commands and exhortations, which both the prophets and apostles employ everywhere? They are nothing else than *expositions of the law*, which lead us to obey the law rather than away from it." Lutherans speak here not of law (*lex*) but of [evangelical] admonition (*mandatum*), etc. Pictet says, "Christ has redeemed us from the yoke of the curse of the law but not from the necessity of rendering obedience to God."<sup>vii</sup> It belongs to the kingly office of Christ to urge his people according to God's *eternal law*. An abrogation of the *moral law* is not possible because "it is based for the most part on the natural justice of God. Other laws are based on the positive justice of God, which depends on the mere will of God."<sup>viii</sup> Hulsius too teaches similarly: "Nevertheless, while the use of the law does not cease, namely, that through it *prior to faith* the spirit of servitude might produce the beginnings of conversion, just as *after faith*, when the spirit of servitude has already been changed into the spirit of adoption, the same law is a mirror of gratitude for the liberation through Christ."<sup>ix</sup> And Mastricht says, "The chief norm of obedience is the divine law" as "a prescription of duty under the threat of punishment for the scorner." The obedience is "that part of spiritual life by which the Christian is inclined to carry out the will of God, with subjection through faith, to the glory of God." Obedience has its origin "in the regenerating, converting and sanctifying grace of God, as well as in faith."<sup>x</sup>

It could not be expressed more definitely than this, namely, that the law applies *to the believer as such*, while Lutherans declare that the believer is free from the coercion (*coactio*) and threat (*comminatio*) of the law in that he as a believer voluntarily (*sua sponte*) does what is Godpleasing. Consequently, he does not need the external prod of a demanding law standing over him. Only because the believer as he is in this life (*in concreto*) is *also something else besides a believer* does the law still also apply to him to convict him of sin. The Reformed, on the other hand, let law apply to the believer *because and in so far as* he is a believer. For God wants nothing from us except that we follow the law, as the *Geneva Catechism* states; and because we can never follow it completely, it keeps pride down by means of its constant condemnations. "Finally, the law serves them as *a curb* by which they are kept in the fear of God."<sup>xi</sup>

This insistence that the law applies to the Christian has often given the application of Scripture to morals and life in the Reformed Church a distressing and rigoristic quality. Even *Scripture itself* serves more or less as a law, as the rule given by Christ the King to his people. The Mosaic commandments were given in part such a literal interpretation as is unknown in the Lutheran Church: the zeal for the proper observance of Sunday, which has from way back been a characteristic symptom of the Reformed church, presupposed throughout the acceptance of the binding nature of the Sabbath commandment.

From this came also the prohibition of the use of pictures, which significantly influenced public worship. Yes, it is a completely Reformed concept that *faith itself* in the form of a command and as *something required of a person, is* referred back to the Mosaic law, that is, to the authority of the divine will.

The *Scottish Confession* states, "To have one God, to hear his Word, to believe in him and to take part in his holy sacraments—these are works of the First Table."<sup>xii</sup> Here belongs also the custom in the French service of reading the Ten Commandments in the worship service, which in the English is an integral part of the communion service.

This also explains the placement which the Ten Commandments receive in the Geneva, Heidelberg and other Reformed catechisms, in distinction from the Lutheran catechism. As the norm for good works, which have faith as their essential element, the exposition of them comes only after the development of faith. Only the oldest Bern catechism has the Lutheran arrangement in that it places the Commandments first, but not in the sense of the Lutheran catechism, where they are first of all only to arouse the sense of sin.

In a similar way, from that difference in understanding the law as a norm for action, there follows also a basic difference in the way *the worship service is* considered. The Reformed Christian likes to view the worship service above all as a work of the believer which he owes to God, as a *duty to God*, a proof of his gratitude, so that he even comes very close to applying the idea of sacrifice to the service. For the Lutheran, on the other hand, the worship service is primarily *a service which God renders to us*, a way by which he bestows his grace on us, the high point of which is the sacrament, which, viewed as *our* activity, is a seeking for grace, an enjoyment of God.

Finally, according to the Reformed view, prayer is placed under the duties prescribed by the law for the believer. For that reason the *Heidelberg Catechism* treats it only *after* the Commandments, almost as the highest exercise, as a rendering of gratitude to God. For Lutherans it is just the opposite. There it is found under the means for the subjective appropriation of salvation, for the strengthening and enjoyment of faith. It is a means of sanctification and at the same time a great *privilege*, which adoption as God's children bestows. Among Lutherans, Gellert was the first to sing about a *duty to pray*.<sup>xiii</sup>

If we, to begin with, restrict ourselves to the fact that, according to the Lutheran conception, the believer *as such* does not need the law but only *as one who has not yet been completely regenerated*, and that, according to the Reformed conception, the believer *precisely as a believer* and a person who is regenerated needs the law, then without even considering the difference also in the definition of the law itself, a somewhat different understanding of *faith itself* becomes evident.

From the Lutheran standpoint, in the justified person faith, bringing with it the *unio mystics*, is such a unity of the human subject with the divine that he finds in himself the norm and stimulus for his actions. He no longer needs to receive this from the outside. Because he has been given the Holy Spirit, he is an independent source of a divine manifestation in his life and his activity. The law, therefore, does not stand *over* him anymore as something *foreign* to his will, but it *has passed over into his will* as the impulse of love, inflamed by the Holy Spirit...But in this life faith is never present in such ideal perfection. A believer, to be sure, soars in inspired moments to this pure height in keeping with his real nature. Otherwise, however, he still carries around with him the natural man, who only through a long and hard battle is transformed and enlightened by the Holy Spirit, active in faith.<sup>xiv</sup> *Only because of the Old Man* does the believer also need the law as a taskmaster of the flesh in the interest of the spirit. Thus the law has for him a negative function. All truly Christian, positive action, however, proceeds *from faith itself*, which receives from itself guidance and impulse – which is, naturally, to be compared with the law and verified by it.

For the Reformed, faith is, of course, also a unity with the divine, *but only as a principle and beginning*. Its actual realization lies in immeasurable infinity. It is not an ideal law which already includes in itself the totality of all development. Faith, as such unity created by the Holy Spirit, possesses the will, the striving and the abstract, general direction. But the norm for faith and the will,

which is carried along by faith, in individual situations always is the divine will *as something still standing over it, demanding* the particular action. The "you must" has not yet been overcome, but rather *sharpened*. Only now does the believer begin to understand the law in its spiritual nature. Its commands and promises, as well as its threats and prohibitions, become more penetrating because they are now understood in faith.

So, just *because* faith has been kindled, *for that reason* the law is necessary, which urges one on to action. It is precisely the regenerate person who needs the law for his development, his perfection, his positive progress, his manifestations of obedience and his good works, which should glorify God. By no means does he need the law only to control and discipline the unregenerate part in him....The law is necessary for him because it rests on the natural law of God, that is, because the difference between the finite and the infinite always continues, and the former can have its norm only in the latter. The norm of the infinite will always become known to the finite only as a categorical imperative. This is that being kept in the fear of God by the curb of the law [mentioned in the *Geneva Catechism*] also in the case of the regenerate person. The law must always preserve the reverence which is fitting for the finite as such over against the infinite.

This, then, is the basis for the Lutheran charge that *Reformed piety is servile, legalistic and not evangelically free*. The Reformed Christian fears nothing more than that under the pretext of evangelical freedom licentiousness might set in. That is why he emphasizes the law, so strongly at times that he comes dangerously close to infringing on evangelical freedom.

Thus Bayly writes, "One should live, therefore, as if there were no gospel and die as if there were no law. In life we should act as if no one but Moses ruled over us."<sup>xv</sup> The Lutheran, on the other hand, fears nothing so much as work-righteousness and is very concerned that the striving for sanctification which is based on faith might not become that.<sup>xvi</sup> Therefore the law always serves him only to convict him of sin.<sup>xvii</sup> That which is positively good is only a work of the freedom of faith in the Spirit. The law is needed only because the individual as the one who *is acting* is still always a sinner. In connection with the apostolic text about the law of freedom [Jas 1:25], the Reformed emphasizes the word *law* as real law, while the Lutheran emphasizes the word *freedom* as freedom from the law in the true sense of the word, so that the law of freedom signifies the norm that is present in the believer himself. The Reformed theologian mistrusts what is present in the believer in the form of something which merely motivates him just as we found him mistrusting faith, which is something direct and emotional in him. As the condition of being in faith must be demonstrated to his own self-consciousness through works, so the subjective, impelling norm for action must be legitimized for him by means of the objective law.

The forms of teaching of the two confessions are reduced finally to the difference which appears also in the philosophical ethics of every age and which can be designated as the positions of Kant<sup>xviii</sup> and Jacobi.<sup>xix</sup> For Kant the norm of the good is the *categorical imperative*, which although it unconsciously contains the autonomously given law of a person's own reason, appears for his empirical consciousness with a higher external authority, as it were, as a law, that is, as a power over a person's life, the acceptance of which by his will is mediated by a feeling of respect. Between law as a general norm and inclination as an individual's drives there is a perpetual difference: law is the overpowering and restricting of the latter by the former.

According to Jacobi, the norm of what is good is not at all to be thought of as an abstract intellectual form and something confronting man as an imperative, but what is good is the display of the ethical natural impulse of human nature itself. A law is therefore for a virtuous person not at all present as an external norm opposed to his inclinations. It is not what he should do over against what he wants to do. Rather, the good is whatever a virtuous person wills according to the basic drives of his nature.

Lutherans, similarly,<sup>xx</sup> teach that no law is given for a believer, for a righteous person. He of himself does the works of the law, with, of course, the above-mentioned restriction.

Classic for this doctrine is the oft-quoted passage from Luther's Table Talks:

It is therefore just as absurd and stupid when they say: The righteous person should do good works, as when they say: God should do good; the sun should shine; the pear tree should bear pears; three plus seven should be ten, since all of this follows naturally of necessity because of the thing itself and the result which is determined.

Or, that I may state it still more clearly and plainly: all this follows without the command and order of a single law, naturally and willingly, without force or compulsion. For that for which each thing has been created, that it does without law and compulsion. The sun shines by nature, without being told to; the pear tree bears pears of itself, without being compelled to, etc. Therefore one may not command a righteous person to do good works, for he does them without any command or compulsion because he is a new creation and a good tree. Because we human beings do not do as we should and what we should after the first creation when Adam and Eve were created in righteousness and innocence, *for this reason* God gave the law—that he might point out to us and convince us by means of it that we now are not God's but the devil's work.<sup>xxi</sup>

Such a unity of the Absolute with the finite as the Lutheran point of view posits for the consciousness of the true, justified believer, who, impelled by the divine Spirit, is himself the norm and rule of his actions, is an altogether foreign thought for the Reformed point of view. The latter is based on a consideration which sharply distinguishes between the two; and the believer's consciousness too as something concrete and finite is constantly influenced by the divine will, which is infinite, as something which is always held before his eyes. Because the believer, too, is finite, the law applies to him so that his finite nature might become active and develop in keeping with the norm of the infinite.

According to Lutheran theology, the believer needs the law *only because he is still a sinner*, that is to say, he is not yet a perfect believer in every respect, not yet a person who has the absolute principle as the all-determining dynamic of his life. For the Lutheran, therefore, the activity called forth by the law is directed principally to the work itself, to practicing the personal and indeed negative virtues, to subduing evil desires (*concupiscentia*). The believer's chief concern is to rid himself more and more of the remnants of his sinful Old Man. Precisely these remnants are recognized in the mirror of the law and are constantly struck by its reprimands. As a *believer*, however, who no longer is under the law, he has only to conserve the faith he has by always establishing himself in it anew. Here, too, of course, belongs the manifestation of love in his outward activities, if indeed he is to avoid losing the fellowship with God he already has.

According to the Reformed view, on the other hand, a believer becomes secure as far as he himself and his final, definite overpowering of sin are concerned only by doing good works. His chief activity to which the divine law summons him is therefore directed toward outward work, toward the positive shaping of the world according to the divine norm.

This basic difference, which is, to be sure, in itself rather subtle but nevertheless very significant and characteristic with respect to the authority of the law, not only gives Reformed piety its particular quality and spirit, but also has consequences and similarities in other doctrines. It is, for example, reflected also in *the doctrine of the law in general*.

The doctrine of man's *original state* together with *the concept of the divine image* rightly comes into consideration first of all. If, according to Lutheran teaching, the law is not made for a righteous person, if it has reference only to sin, then it had no place in the state of created, original righteousness. *Man in the holy divine image was without the law. His* condition is thought of as the perfect *unio mystica*, the gracious indwelling of the most holy Trinity. The *command not to eat* is therefore only something negative and *does not come under the concept of law*. It was only a pedagogic measure in the interest of confirming the state of innocence. It also gave man opportunity, however, to enter into sin and so into the position of being under the law.

According to the Reformed, on the other hand, the first man was under the law just like the believer. For the former, too, the objective, divine will existed as a norm *outside* himself, according to which he was *obligated* to live and conduct himself. After all, the necessity of a progressive

development into perfection was facing him. Such perfection he had not yet received with the divine image, but it was intended for him. Even as a bearer of the divine image Adam was subject to the prescriptive dictates of the law in the form of a commanding conscience, which in this form constitutes an essential motivating element of human nature. For human nature is simply the finite, which can get to know the divine will as the absolute only in this form. The purely finite sees the infinite opposite it and sees itself only as different from and dependent on it.

Lutherans, by way of contrast, see Adam as the final product of God's creation, who did not need any real development but only to persevere and be confirmed in holiness. Enjoying the most intimate unity with God by virtue of the indwelling of the Trinity, he was the perfect human model. Because he was created with perfect righteousness, the difference between what one should do and what one wants to do, between God's will and his own will, *did not even exist*. God's will was expressed only as that which was identical with man's will. Man's will was in full conformity with God's. That a separation occurred between the two and the consciousness of the divine will became a reality as a demanding conscience is already the result of sin.

The *imperative* form of the divine will in the conscience became a reality only then when God had to call man to account and condemn him. It is, however, no more essential than the form whereby God called man to account and condemned him and is *only a testimony to the already degenerate quality* of human nature. Rather, only that original holy impulse which was at the bottom of that divine commanding is shown to be essential; this is not law, not duty, but willingness, love. And this is restored from the categorical imperative form through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by faith. It was only when the Reformed idea of a covenant of works and a covenant of grace was adopted that Lutheran teaching began to abandon this view, which originated from exegetical considerations.

In the preceding presentation by Schneckenburger all scriptural proof is omitted. He presented it from the standpoint of a teacher of comparative symbolics. What he presents, however, as the Lutheran way of teaching in contrast to the Reformed, is the genuine evangelical teaching of the Scriptures, which the Apostle Paul especially sets forth and insists on. This we attempted to elucidate in the previous article in the *Quarterly*.<sup>xxii</sup>

The more completely this teaching becomes a part of the very fiber of our being, the better witnesses of the gospel we will be and the more fruit we will produce. By the same token, there is no more dangerous false teaching than that which changes the gospel into law.

---

Notes marked with an asterisk(\*) are by the editor.

<sup>i</sup> See "*Dem Gerechten ist kein Gesetz gegeben*," *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 1916), pp 17-49, translated by K. G. Sievert in *Wisconsin Lutheran Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (October 1960), pp 238-256, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 1961), pp 27-42.\*

<sup>ii</sup> Max Schneckenburger, *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs* (Stuttgart, 1855), Part I, pp 109-133.\*

<sup>iii</sup> Friedrich Adolf Philippi (1809-1882) was the son of a Jewish banker who became a prominent, conservative German Lutheran theologian.\*

<sup>iv</sup> See the quotation from Luther's Table Talks near the end of this article.

<sup>v</sup> Joh. Gerhard, *Loci Theologici*, IV, 290.

<sup>vi</sup> Benedict Pictet, *Medulla theologiae Christianae didacticae et elencticae* (Geneva, 1711), p 159. Pictet (1655-1724) was a Swiss Reformed theologian.\*

<sup>vii</sup> *Op cit*, p 126.

<sup>viii</sup> *Ibid*, p 97.

<sup>ix</sup> Anton Hulsius, *Systema controversiarum theologicarum* (Lug. Bat., 1677), p 426. Hulsius (born 1615) was a Reformed theologian in The Netherlands.\*

<sup>x</sup> Peter van Mastricht, *Theoretico-practica Theologia* (Traject., 1699) p 1103. Van Mastricht (1650-1706) was a Dutch Reformed theologian.\*

<sup>xi</sup> "*Postremo freni instar illis est, quo in dei timore retineantur.*"\*

<sup>xii</sup> The Scottish Confession, Chap. 14.

<sup>xiii</sup> Christian Fuerchtegott Gellert (1715-1769), a German poet and writer. One of his hymns, "Jesus Lives! The Vict'ry's Won," appears in *The Lutheran Hymnal* (#201).\*

<sup>xiv</sup> Strictly speaking, it is not the Old Man that is transformed and enlightened but the Christian, who, as he grows in sanctification, more and more puts off the Old Man and puts on the New Man (Eph 4:22-24; Col 3:9,10).\*

<sup>xv</sup> Lewis Bayly, *Praxis Pietatis* (Bern, 1703), p 125. Bayly (1565-1631), was an English preacher and churchman, who had a great influence on German Pietism. His *Praxis Pietatis* was translated into many languages.\*

<sup>xvi</sup> That is, that it does not become *work-righteousness*. One cannot deny, however, that as the Reformed with his position denies evangelical freedom, so the Lutheran can all too easily fall into spiritual inactivity and fleshly security. That we too do not completely avoid this danger follows from the fact that the abundance of works, which the Reformed sects can exhibit in such great measure, is lacking among us. We think only of the great sacrifices which the Reformed sects bring for the local congregation, for educational and charitable institutions and for missions, while among us financial need in all branches of church activity is a chronic condition. Even in that *one* area in which we until now stood far in front of the Reformed churches, namely, in the area of the parish school, our zeal is beginning to flag because its maintenance demands continuous effort and expenditures. The parish school is, of course, not of divine institution or command, and our faith now does not have enough strength and energy to overcome the indolence of the Old Adam. If we regarded the school and other branches of church activity as a strict divine command, then our zeal for its maintenance and improvement would perhaps be greater. But that we would thereby be richer in real good works cannot be proved, for all good works are good only in so far as they proceed from faith itself *freely* and not forced by the law. Accordingly, the cure for our lack of works does not consist in this that we become more legalistic in our Christianity and adopt something of the Reformed spirit, but in this that we, in a genuinely Lutheran spirit, apply the law in its sharpness as a mirror to our lazy flesh, that we allow ourselves to be judged and condemned by it, that we become alarmed at our lack of energy because of which we neglect God's kingdom and poor souls, and that we flee again to grace and from its fullness and fervor, which surpasses all human thought, acquire for ourselves new, *free*, spiritual willpower (A.P.).

<sup>xvii</sup> Just as the law serves as a mirror, so naturally it serves also as a rule and curb—because of the flesh (A.P.)

<sup>xviii</sup> Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), influential German philosopher.\*

<sup>xix</sup> Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), German philosopher, critic of Kant.\*

<sup>xx</sup> Naturally, the similarity is only *formal* (A.P.).

<sup>xxi</sup> *Dr. Martin Luthers Saemmtliche Schriften* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1887), XXII, 445f.

<sup>xxii</sup> See endnote #1 above.