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THE BATTLE OF CEDARBURG IN 1862 AND ITS EFFECT ON LUTHERAN MISSION ENDEAVORS AMONG THE WISCONSIN INDIANS

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If we were asked what the most famous battle of history was, I am sure that many different answers would arise. Perhaps we would mention such events as the Battle of Midway, Napolean's defeat at Waterloo of the Battle of Hastings in 1066. If we were asked to list famous battles fought on American soil, names like Valley Forge, the Battle at Gettysberg and Custer's Last Stand would surely come to mind. Chances are, the Battle of Cedarburg is an event that few people know of and even less care about. In fact, almost as soon as this event took place, the people directly involved in it tried to forget that it ever happened at all.

What impact did the Battle of Cedarburg have on Wisconsin history? More importantly, did it have any impact on the church history of the Wisconsin Synod or American Lutheranism? It will be the purpose of this paper to examine the extent of that impact. First of all, we want to take a look at the event itself in some detail. Then we will procede to examine the effects of the event on the Lutheran church in Wisconsin and the Lutheran's missionary efforts to the Indians in Wisconsin.

In order to better understand the cause of the panic in 1862, we should first try to get a feel for the living conditions in Wisconsin at the time of the Civil War. Remember that Wisconsin first achieved statehood only in 1848. By the time of the Civil War, much of Wisconsin was thinly populated and remained

a vast wilderness. (see Appendix 1) Immigrants were still streaming in from Europe with the expectation of carving a niche for themselves in this untamed land. Outside of Milwaukee and the surrounding area, settlements were generally small and fairly isolated. Decent roads were few and traveling conditions to many areas of the state were often difficult. Communication between communities and people was poor and slow. In general, the living conditions were still fairly primative.

It is important to keep these conditions in mind, especially as we take a look at contemporary events taking place in Minnesota. It was the events here that lead to the immediate cause of the Battle of Cedarburg and the scare in other areas of Wisconsin. In August 17, 1862, a group of young Sioux Indians murdered five settlers in the Minnesota Valley. This was the beginning of an Indian uprising in Minnesota. The Sioux attacks on white settlements lasted for almost six weeks and left several hundred civilians dead. It took Federal troops that long to bring order and peace back to the state. (1)

This panic quickly spread into Wisconsin. It was spread not only by the rumors and fears of those who had heard about this event, but also by the 40,000 Minnesotans who fled their state out of fear for themselves and who then personally recounted their versions of the story. The most panic stricken of he cities in Wisconsin was Superior City (Also one of the closest to the uprising in Minnesota). This town of a few hundred isolated inhabitants expected the Chippewa Indians to follow in the footsteps of the Sioux. To prepare for the anticipated onslaught, they formed a Committee of Safety which ordred every male, ages

18-60 to report fo guard duty. It then moved te people of the city "to sleep wihin a square bounded by specified streets, leaving enough empty houses in the rest of the city to accomodate several regiments." (2)

The rumors soon spread to adjacent areas of Wisconsin, east and south, through almost the whole state. As news of the impending Indian attack spread, so did the fear and panic which increased the number of those who tried to flee from their homes to a place of safety. "At the cry, 'The Indians are coming!' farmers left their harvesting, loaded their families into wagons and took to the roads in search of security. Those streaming into Fon du Lac from Calumet brought word that the 'red devils' had plundered and burned Manitowoc and Sheboygan and were advancing toward Fon du Lac. People heading from Sheboygan, about 4000 of them, made it over the single draw bridge into town; but later arrivals found the bridge up, it having been raised to keep he Indians out." (3)

Cries of alarm spread from city to city. "Manitowoc is in ashes! Sheboygan plundered and burning! 300 Indians advancing on New Holstein!" The people reacted to these messages in a variety of ways. In Manitowoc it seems that the women were the first to take up their cities defense, as they gathered in the courthouse with jars of boiling water ready to throw on any invaders. It is not recorded what the men did, though there was a report of one man who prepared for the coming Indians by hiding in a feather bed. "In fact, all down the line, if reports are to be believed, it was mainly the women who rose to the defense of their homes and the men who fled."(4)

Well, it was not long before rumors of this great Indian uprising made it all the way to Milwaukee. After all, Milwaukee was the great metropolis of the day. It was the center for all the civilized and sophisticated people of Wisconsin. These rumors were spread by those who personally "witnessed" the massacring, pilaging, looting hoardes of red devils. By the evening of Sept 4, 1862, wagonloads of refugees from this "war" began arriving, some from as far away as Madison. In these wagons there were people screaming, "The Injuns are cumin'." They brought wih them gruesome horror stories the Pewaukee was wiped out, people lying in puddles of their own blood, that West Bend was "surrounded by howling redskins bent on butchering the population". It was even claimed that Hartland, Oconomowoc and Cedarburg were all in flames. (5)

Even though, as the facts later proved, no one had really ever even seen any of these things happen, the fear was very real in their minds and led to what we today would consider to be an extreme and exaggerated reacton. One man from Lisbon, for example, was so scared that he did not stop his flight even after he had reached Milwaukee, but got a boat and rowed out into the lake, spending a cold night there in the rain. The town of Richfield sent a telegram pleading, "Please send us troops and arms by the first train. The Indians are wihin 5 miles of here and are murdering and burning everything they come across. They burned Cedarburg last night." (6) One father threw his two children into his wagon and dashed for Milwaukee. It was not until he heard them screaming and crying that he looked back, only to find that he had grabbed the wrong two children.

Soon, Milwaukee was a "seething mass of badly frightened people". (7) The roads became clogged and jammed wih people fleeing the "carnage". It was reported that one man even brought his wife into town in a wheelbarrow. The owner of the Republican Hotel opened his doors wide, giving the refugees free shelter for the night. (8) However, most Milwaukee shopkeepers and businesses saw that there was money to be made and raised their prices drastically, especially on the price of firearms. Undoubtedly, many an old musket sold for more than a new one would have.

Those that did not flee prepared for the confrontation as best they could. Mobs of men gathered in most towns and villages, carrying old muskets, axes, pitchforks, clubs or whatever they could lay their hands on at short notice. A tavern keeper in Port Washington moved some of his stock into a crossroads, hoping to "decoy the plundering hordes with firewater". (9) One woman armed herself with a can of pepper to throw in the eyes of the Indians. Another family set up a toy cannon in front of the door and loaded it up with powder and spikes.

Efforts were made by many to keep their valuable from falling into the hands of the Indians before they fled. Some buried their money to keep it safe. Others destroyed what they had to keep it away from the Indians. Flour was dumped into the rivers. One family scattered its furniture over a 10 acre area so that the Indians would not be able to destroy it all at once. One woman turned her pigs into the vegitable garden, thinking that the vegetables would be of no more use to her and the animals might as well have one good meal before the Indians killed them. The situation was summed up by a contemporary observer who wrote,

"Every bush had an Indian behind it, every moan of the wind was an Indian signal, the hoot of the owl was the infuriated whoop of an army of savages." (10)

Once these "refugees" reached Milwaukee and told their stories, what did the authorites do? What steps did the govenor take at the time to bring order to the state and relief to the people's fears? In late August, Govenor Salomon called Capt. Maurice Samuel of the First Wisconsin Infantry home from Kentucky to head any necessary military action against these attacking Indians. On August 30, after scouting the northern part of the state, he reported back that there was a considerable amount of apprehension among the people and tat alarms were often sounded, only causing residents to rush about "imagining the bloody scenes of the pioneer days of old to be upon them." (11) The next step Capt. Sammuel took was to talk to A-que-en-zee, a war chief of the Chippewa tribe. He assured Capt. Sammuel that the tribe had only the most peaceful of intentions. Such information led to the following report, "The fear is mutual, and he Indians and whites are trying to outdo each other in conceding territory-ie while the whites are running in one direction, the Indians are running in another." (12)

Yet Govenor Salomon declared, "I do not propose to wait until butchery commences, as in Minnesota, but to arm the people for defense, and thus enable them to take care of themselves, so tht our troops can leave for the South and East." (13) With this intention, he enouraged towns to form home guard units and sent all available guns to potential trouble spots, especially the Superior City region. In all about 2000 guns plus a number of

solders were sent to towns all oround the state.

Once the great influx of "refugees" made their way into Milwaukee on Sept. 4, 1862 and Cedarburg was reported to be in flames, Govenor Salomon ordered Captain Charles Lehman to march up to Ozaukee County with his militia. A reporter from the Milwaukee Sentinel reported the particulars of this "campaign" with these words, "We arrived this morning about 5 o' clock, after a forced march of several hours. Our artillery ws left in Milwaukee, and a detachment of about 10 men was left in Humbolt as a reserve." (14) They scouted the area, listened to the reports of alarmed citizens, but could find only one Indian. Realizing that there ws nothing for them to do, thy returned to Milwaukee on Sept. 7, feeling kind of foolish about the whole venture. It was this event that formed the climax of the scare and facetiously became known as the Battle of Cedarburg.

It was soon after this that the whole matter finally came to rest. Most of this was due to the ridicule that was poured upon the incident and the people involved by the local newspapers. Notable among these were the reports of the Milwaukee Sentinel, the premier Wisconsin newspaper of the day. The more sophisticated people of Milwaukee wanted to discount the incidents validity from the onset, but were just a little unsure of their smugness at first. On Sept. 5, 1862, we read, "Up to this hour, we have recieved no confirmation of any of the reports (ie of the burning of Cedarburg, the invasion of the Indians, etc.) and indeed attach but little importance to them. But throughout the afternoon, families with teams continued to arrive; in rapid succession each frightened countryman telling the same story of

impending devestation....We opine (sic) a very big but groundless scare has taken place, though what may have originated it, it is impossible to state at this time. We conversed wih several from the vicinity of Cedarburg, and all of hem agreed tht the houses in tha town were burning when they left, but as we stated before, not a man, woman, or child have been able to discover who had seen an Indian."(15)

However, by the next day, when independant reports confirmed the fact that the entire scare was built around groundless fears, the sarcasm and satire began in earnest. The heading for the story in Saturday's edition, Sept. 6 read, "The Indian War: Full Particulars of the Campaign". The following is a typical exerpt, "Our commander took them (area refugees heading south) into his tent, and commenced to interrogate them. 'How far is Cedarburg? Yaw. Have you seen any Injuns? Yaw. Who is in command of the enemy army? Yaw. How many houses have they burned? Yaw.' After thus gleaning a vast deal of important information necessary to determine the future operations of he ompany, the fugitives were ordered outside our lines." (16)

The ridicule probably reached its climax in the Sept. 8 edition. In this article "From the Battle Field of Cedarburg" we read: "Early this morning our commanding officer recieved intelligence from a number of families that Cedarburg had been burnt to the ground again....About nine o' clock we made another reconnoissance in force and discovered the enemy in the woods on our right. One of the officers, who had just recieved reinforcements in the shape of Monumental oysters from Tanyk McCraken, successfully 'shelled' the woods and dislodged the

enemy. He is now understood to have retreated to Cedarburg and we momentarily expect to hear that the town is being again burned." (17)

As the soldiers returned, the sarcasm poured on and the truth of the matter made perfectly clear, the panic began to subside. The people began to realize that the only thing they had been fleeing from was their own fears. As they began to acknowledge that they literally had nothing to be afraid of, they began to feel very foolish about the whole thing. Many tried inventing excuses as to why they had made such a mad rush into Milwaukee, not wanting to admit the true reason for coming. Soon it was hard to even find anyone who would admit to being a participant in the "great migration of 1862". (see Appendix 2 for an eyewitness account of the events in Cedarburg)

Not suprisingly, the reaction of the Indians to this whole series of incidents was very similar to that of the white mans'. As was mentioned already in the military report, the fear was mutual. In a letter to the editor, published in the Sept. 11 Sentinel, the Indian reaction was described this way: "The most notable feature of this great migration is that the Indians themselves became panic stricken. They heard of the preparations of the whites and under the apprehension that large bodies of troops were coming to slaughter them, commenced to scatter themselves and throw up pickets." (18) Undoubtedly, from their past experiances with the white men, they realized tht even though their fears were groundless, an excited white man can be a very dangerous white man.

It is hard for us today in our truly modern society to

imagine how such a chain of events could take place. (Although something similar did take place on a nation wide basis when "War of the Worlds" was first broadcast on the radio.) As one historian put it, "The citizens of Wisconsin were no more fools than anyone else." (19) So what could have caused such unfounded fears? After all, there were only about 9000 Indians left in the state in 1862 compared to some 800,000 white people. The white population of Wisconsin truly had no real reason to fear, for the Indians "were largely civilized and friendly to the whites. Several hundred of them were with the Civil War regiments. Even had the Indians been hostile, it would have been folly to riot against te whites who outnumbered them 90-to-1 and had superior weapons and resources." (20)

Those early Wisconsinites' fears were not totally without basis however. Surely the Black Hawk war of the summer of 1832 was still vivid in the minds of the older citizens. In this battle, hundreds of whites and Indians alike lost their lives. But with the Indian defeat, "Indian resistance of white expansion in Wisconsin come to an end. Thereafter the tribes pliantly ceded to the United States their remaining properties. By 1856 Indian title to Wisconsin lands covered only a few reservations." (21) During the years 1825-1837 it was the government policy to remove Indians to areas west of the Mississippi. Most of those that remained surely did not want to cause a problem that would in turn bring about their deportation also.

But there were some isolated incidents of Indian aggression. The first "Indian scare" occured in August 26, 1861, just one year before our story. An eye witness discribed it this

way: "About two dozen Indians with their women and children at the time had their wigwam on the north shore of Horicon Lake, not far from Hartford. Nearby some Germans had settled, and one of them had shot a pony belonging to one of the Indians, which had broken into his cornfield. The Indian, half drunk, had chased the German around a stump, without even drawing his knife, but the German, frightened to death, ran to his neighbors and told them of a horrible Indian massacre that was breeding." (22) This incident, which seems very humerous, even a little ridiculous today, caused a panic in Washington County that was similar to the statewide panic a year later.

Also in 1863, just a year after our story, there was yet another Indian scare. On July 14, 1863 a party of Winnebego Indians attacked the farmhouse of George Salter, six miles north of New Lisbon. He returned "to find the house ransaked and his wife dead. She had been beaten badly, her throat had been cut, and she had apparently been raped." (23) The first two Indians that wandered by were then killed and decapitated by Mr. Salter, with their heads mounted on poles. About two weeks later, a Mrs. J. Austin, a resident of the same county, was also attacked. With the aid of a large dog, she was able to beat off her assailents. Because of such incidents, a company of the Thirteenth Regiment was sent in "for the protection of he Indians as well as the whites." (24) Chief Dandy, one of the Winnebago leaders promised to turn over the murderers for the promise of no more reprisals and release of those falsely imprisoned. When this was done, a relative calm again returned to te area. When these incidents are coupled with the previous conflicts and the very real uprising and

massacre of the Sioux in Minnesota in August 1862, perhaps it is easier to understand how such rumors could arise.

There were other factors that contributed to the easily frayed nerves of the citizens of 1862 as well. Perhaps it was because the Union army had not fared so well in war during its first 18 months. This could especially been on the people's minds because this war was popularly touted to be "the three month war". Most people had not expected the war to last very long and felt tht the Union forces would be able to win easily. When their expectations were not realized, it surely must have made the people at least a little insecure.

Remember too that 30,000 men from Wisconsin were engaged in units fighting in the war. This would have removed much of the states possible defense and resources of both men and guns. If this was not enough, the loved Govenor Harvey had just recently drowned in the Tennessee River. The fact that Govenor Salomon responded as he did, rather than just letting the baseless rumors die on their own, surely must have given some credibility and respectability to the rumors and added to the fear and panic. Then, in this time of war, there were also rumors that this was all part of a clever and nearly successful scheme on the part of Confederate agents.

Was there any basis to such rumors? It might seem to be a very real cause of the "scare". After all, if the Confederates could have cause prolonged fear or an actual Indian uprising, it would have caused the govenor in turn to call back the Wisconsin units from the battle front, thus weakening the union army. If their efforts then had been successful in Wisconsin, such tactics

could also have been used in neighboring states, with devestating results for Northern moral and for the strength of the Union army.

There seems to some agreement with this theory from contemporary observers. At least Govenor Salomon was "convinced that some of the Indians had been tampered with by rebel agents." (25) The federal Indian agent at Appelton, a Mr. Davis, reported that he heard from some friendly Winnebago Indians that, "(Chief) Dandy's scheme was to organize the malcontents and, at the strategic moment, to stage on uprising in support of the Confederacy." (26) It was reports such as these that cause th govenor to act as he did, despite the reports of Capt. Samuel. This was why he felt compelled to send troops and arms to potential problem areas.

So whether the Indian scare was caused by Confederate agents or was simply a case of mass hysteria in those primitive and perilous times is difficult if not impossible to prove. It does point out how insecure and easily firghtened the people were durind the 1860's and the time of the Civil war. A letter to the editor published in the Milwaukee Sentinel on Sept. 11, 1862 summed it up well: "The causeless Indian panic of the last few weeks in Wisconsin forms one of the curious episodes in he history of the State, and will often be referred to in illustrating any great unfounded fear." (27) Even though their fears were groundless and proved to be unsubstantiated, yet these events did leave a very real, lasting and profound impression upon the minds of the people in Wisconsin. It is this effect upon the people, the results of their thinking, and the mistrust that developed between the white men and Indians that we want to examine in the

second half of this paper.

II

Since this is to be a church history paper, we will next examine the extent of the impact that this event had upon the Lutheran church in Wisconsin and surrounding states, particularly upon their relationship and mission efforts among the Indians. We want to look at the motivation that was present to do mission work among Wisconsin Indians, the endeavors that took place, the results of Lutheran efforts and the reasons behind these statistics. We especially want to examine the effect of the Indian Scare of 1862, the Battle of Cedarburg on Lutheran mission awareness and undertakings.

The need for missionary activity among the Indian population of Wisconsin should be fairly obvious. By and large, they were still basically heathen people, practicing their animistic pagan rites. A Roman Catholic missionary, Florimond Bonduel, who was active in mission work among the Indians in Wisconsin until his death in 1861, described their spiritual condition and practices in great detail. The following is an exerpt from his report of 1855 back to Europe: "These are men misled by force of habit, by ignorance an by the presumption of education and above all by an all-powerful desire for a supernatural assistence which they have not found to allieviate ther plight and to show the way to happiness. Further, they look to the stars which they worship as guardian gods and from whom thy adopt names....It is not enough for he pagan to unite with the

terrestial world, giving to his children names after wild animals...but these wretched people, pressed by inexplicable blindness, have to worship, even in heaven, the infernal monster in front of whom thy have prostrated themselves so many ties on this earth." (28)

Obviously, religious leaders recognized the spiritual plight of the Indians already in the nineteenth century and long before. They realized that if those Indians were not brought the light of the Gospel that they would be doomed to serving Satan in everlasting darkness. They recognized the fact tht these heathen savages were also included in Jesus' command to make disciples of all nations. There were many who were concerned about the eternal fate of this people, which was native to America and yet whose ways and culture were so foreign to the majority of Wisconsin residents.

Yet it seems that there was more to their motivation than at first meets the eye. At least one historian has come to this conclusion: "They (clergymen) were additionally motivated by a specific feeling of indebtedness to the Indians for the wrong done them in breaking treaties, grabbing their land, and generally defrauding and exploiting them....Again and again it is said that the wrongs can be righted only by the giving of the gospel and Christian civilization. These alone can keep the Indian from extermination and give him the character required to share American civilization and citizenship with the white man." (29) Guilt over past abuses of the Indian could easily have led to additional motivation for evangelization attempts on the part of white men.

But what efforts were being made by Midwest Lutherans in the nineteenth century? Keep in mind what was mentioned before. Lutheran efforts among the Indians of the Midwest could not start until the first arrived and organized. German immigrants to Wisconsin and vicinity really did not start until the early 1800's. Even then, the greatest influx of German's did not begin until about 1840. This accounts for the dates when the Midwest Lutheran synods formed and organized. (Missouri, 1847; Wisconsin, 1850; Minnesota, 1860; etc)

Yet there were some early efforts made. These came primarily because of the influence of Loehe, still a resident of Germany. It was his efforts that brought a large number of men to serve as pastors for the German immigrants to the new world. It was also through his efforts that some of the first attempts were made to bring the gospel to the Midwest Indians. Fredrich Schmidt, the founder of the Michigan Synod, began his work as a missionary tothe Germans AND Indians in 1833 in Michigan. It was his example that inspired Loehe's efforts and led to the formation of Loehe's 3 part plan. This consisted of : "1) provide direct material and spiritual assistence to the settlers as they begin life in their adopted country; 2) utilize the colonists, under the leadership of a missionary, in demonstrating practical aspects of Christian life and hope to the Indians living around them; and 3) establish a church extension fund available to the colonists and their mission endeavors, to be repaid ad thereafter used by another group." (30) Loehe's plan then was "to establish Lutheran congregations in the immediate vicinity of he Indian villages, the pastors of the congregations at the same time serving as

missionaries to he Indians." (31) To implent this, Rev. Craemer came frm Germany in 1845 and founded the first of these colonies at Frankenmuth in Michigan in 1846. As it seemed as if these efforts would b successful, three more colonies were soon established. Frankentrost was established by Rev. John Graebner in 1847, Frankenlust was founded by Rev. Sievers in 1848 and Frankenhilf by Revl Kuehn in 1850.

Loehe, who had close ties with the Missouri Synod, turned the administration of these colonies over to the Missouri Synod in 1849. This was with the understanding that these mission stations would be operated with sound, confessional Lutheran practices. But problems soon arose. In 1848 the Frankenmuth Indians moved to St. Louis, Michigan and so the Bethany mission station was begun. This caused the Frankenmuth mission to close in 1851. In this case, there were also problems with the Methodist missionaries in that area. "(The Methodists) had been and still were making evry effort to coax the Indians away, not only from Bethany, but from the Lutherans in genral." (32) Thus when the Indians of the Bethany station again moved, this time to Isabella Co. 25 miles to the north, in 1860, this signaled the beginning of the end for the Bethany station as well. By 1869 Bethany also closed its doors. All the other mission stations also closed by the Missouri Synod by 1868.

This was not the only effort of the young Missouri Synod however. "From the time of its birth, the Synod had a board charged with Heidenmission which was soon engaged in an active mission to te heathen." (33) This committment was met when Ottomar Cloetter was sent to Minnesota in 1857 to do mission work

among the Chippewa Indians there. Here the Indian massacre and uprisings of 1862, which was one of the primary causes of the scare in Wisconsin, had an effect on these efforts. "(Cloetter's) work, especially after the Indian uprising in 1862, was no more fruitful than earlier efforts in Michigan. Faced with continual reverses, the synod...terminated the work in 1868." (34)

The Iowa Synod sent Johann Schmidt to Montana in 1860 to do work among the Crow Indians there. His efforts were hindered first of all as his partner Braeuninger was murdered later that year. Then, "during the Indian uprising in 1862, the missionaries finally abandoned their station and the work was terminated in 1867." (35)

This pattern of aborted attempts was not limited to just Lutheran missionaries. The American Board, a federation of Protestant church bodies, also had its problems. For instance, they started a mission in Oregon in 1836. But this too ended in failure as the missionaries were massacred in 1847. (36) Other efforts of this board were summed up with these words, "Many of these new missions were short-lived. The incoming whites led to the ceasing of effort for the Creeks and Osages in 1836; the shifting tribal homes closed the mission to the Maumes in 1835, of that to the Mackinaws in 1836 and to the Stockbridge Indians in 1848." (37)

Why did all of these efforts fail? Were the Indian uprisings the sole factor? In areas where there were uprisings, such as in Minnesota and Oregon, obviously this was a major contributing factor. But there were other important factors as well. Most historians agree that the governments policy of removing the Indians west of the Mississippi was one major cause of many of the failures. Already with the earliest attempts, for instance,

"Loehe did not realize that the Indians would gradually move away from such a settlement (ie. Frankenmuth). The government wih its reservation plans also induced the Indians to move to different territories." (38) "The missions generally suffered attrition under removal and were often difficult to reestablish at new sites." (39)

As the Indians were more and more forced to move to reservations and treaties were broken again and again, this fostered distrust of the white man which also contributed to the repeated failures. "The fact was that the roving and lawless habits of the Indians, the interference of hostile white men, the growing prejudice against a government which broke its treaties so lightly, together with the repeated removals of the tribes as the country expanded, made constructive work almost impossible." (40) The overall result of such polices for the missionaries was this: "The white man's word came to be little respected, so that the reputation and good will of the missionaries were seriously hurt in the etes of those who inclined to regard them as of like character with the rest of the race." (41)

This loss of respect in the eyes of the Indians would have been a major deterrent. After all, Loehe's plan of Lutheran colonies was to "demonstrate practical aspects of (Christian) life and hope to the Indians living around them." (42) If the white man's word became worthless, their example would have meant little to the Indians and would have seemed even hypocritical. Undoubtedly, the Indians reaction to the 1862 scare in Wisconsin (as was noted earlier) would have reinforced any such doubts which they may have had concerning the white men. This, in turn, would have lessened the effectiveness of any missionary working in Wisconsin

and would have made it much more difficult even in starting a mission up.

Another major factor that contributed to the lack of success were the missionaries' methods themselves. Not only did the missionaries try to convert the Indians from their heathen religion, but from their uncivilized ways and culture as well. For example, "The education of Indian children in Christianity and German culture was a major aspect of the mission methods adopted by Craemer in the Frankenmuth experiment." (43) Rather than simply to evangelize, most mission efforts also sought to civilize and Germanize the Indans as well. This was a cause for decline in many efforts, as other historians emphatically point out. "A major reason for the numerically small community of believers (among the Indians) is that the missionaries sought to 'civilize' as well as convert and assimilation ot the white pattern was usually considred to reveal te reality of conversion....Points of correspondence and identity in the two faiths were not sought, recognized and employed in the communication of the gospel and in fostering the growth of an indigenous church." (44) We would not agree with this author's opinion about the inherrant value of any part of the natural Indian religion. Yet such questionable methods seem to have distracted from the missionaries effectiveness in general. We could sum it all up this way, "Neither zeal nor sacrifice were lacking in the Indian mission enterprise. Rathermobility of the Indians resulting from governmental policies, the demoralizing assosiation with unprincipled white people an unrealistic mission methods all interacted to thwart and finally end the work." (45

But what about efforts in Wisconsin? It seems that there

were no concerted efforts among the Lutheran synods to establish mission stations among the Indians in Wisconsin prior to the troubles of 1862. The Wisconsin Synod had no missioary efforts to Indians in any state until 1893 and that was the Apaches in Arizona. There were a number of reasons why this was the case.

First, as was mentioned before, the Midwestern Lutheran synods were just forming in the mid-nineteenth century. For instance, Rev. Muelheuser, the founder of the Wisconsin Synod did not even arrive in Milwaukee until June 1848. The Wisconsin Synod did not form until 1850. By 1860, there were only about 20 parishes and 48 congregations in the Wisconsin Synod. (46) The initial organization of the Synod undoubtedly took a lot of effort and time. Once these initial organizational efforts ere completed, there was then the task of forming theological training schools to provide enough pastors for the increasing demand of German immigrants. Then came the task of establishing te Wisconsin Synods strict confessional status. This included breaking off relations with the unionistic mission societies of Europe in 1868 (thus also ending all financial assistence that they were recieving from them), weeding out unionistic elements within the Synod and becoming a part of the Synodical conference in 1872.

The second reason why there was an absence of Lutheran missionaries to the Indians, especially in the Wisconsin Synod is found in the immigration statistics. German immigration to Wisconsin did not start in earnest until about 1830 and was heaviest from 1840-1854. (47) The mission societies of Europe saw the preservation of these German Lutherans in the Lutheran faith as their main goal for the New World. "Therefore the flood of German

immigrants that was the making of the church caused also for some time the retarding of its wider mission." (48) They saw this as their chief task and their foremost home mission field. For example, "the new (Michigan) synod correctly recognized its chief purpose, home mission work, serving the scattered bretheren with he word and sacrament and gathering them into congregations." (49) This was also the case with the Norwegian Augustana Synod, as resolution #4 from 1870 stated, "The mission field hich lies closest to us as a Synod is the thousands of our countrymen who are streaming to this ountry and out task is to gather and organize them into ongregations and build them up in our most holy faith." (50)

So, despite the good intentions that the young Lutheran church bodies had, a shortage of pastors and overflowing of German Lutheran immigrants combined to make this the most important task for the Luthran Synods. Indeed, there was a great need for and demand for workers among the newly arrived German Lutherans. This would have also been the easiest mission field that would have yielded the most visible results. By 1862, there were only some 9000 Indians in Wisconsin as compared to some 800,000 white setlers. Large congregations could soon be formed from this much larger group, congregations that were mostly self-sustaining. The language, culture and ways would be known to the pastor in his evangelization of the German immigrants. Liturgy, Bible and other theological books and magazines were all available to the the pastor and were well-known to their potential German Lutheran congregations. Thus it could be said of the Missouri Synod for example, "Early in its history the brand new synod was full of magnificent plans to carry the Gospel to the heahen...but by the end

of he century the standard inquiry of the prarie Reisprædiger was 'Wohnen auch Deutsche hier?'" (51)

Closely related to this was also the limited financial resources of the young Lutheran synods. Most of those that immigrated to Wisconsin were not the wealthy of Europe. Many were middle-class or poor farmers seeking their fortunes in the New World. The act of coming to America surely must have drained much of the savings of the newly arrived immigrants. Even though land was fairly cheap, it still was not given away. Then there was the time and effort involved in just clearling the land and starting a farm or some other business. While starting a new life, almost from scratch, the immigrant farmer would still have to provide enough food to feed his family. In general, the desire and support for mission work was often present, but "the theoretical an theological support for such a (mission) program, however was greater than the support of available men and money." (52) There just was not alot of hard cash available to the young synods to finance men to work exclusively among the Indians.

The third reason was the sporadic uprisings and rebellions of the Indians. In Minnesota in 1862, this was a very real threat. "During the Indian uprising of 1862, (Cloetter) was more than once in peril of death. It was only through the aid of a friendly chief that Cloetter and his family saved their lived." (53) Obviously, when missionaries were killed (as happened in Oregon in 1847 and Montana in 1960) this hindered and set back the spread of the Gospel there. Even though there was no Indian uprising in Wisconsin since the Black Hawk war of 1832, the fear of such uprisings and the possibility of such problems had to be a factor in the lack of

mission efforts made. Indian revolts were a direct contributing cause of the close of several missions in the Midwest. Undoubtedly it was also a cause of an absense of effort on the part of the Wisconsin Synod and among other synods in their work within Wisconsin.

The Battle of Cedarburg was but a reflection of the mistrust and fear of the Indians that the white, German settlers had. The members of at least one congregation in Wisconsin reacted this way to the news of an Indian uprising in September of 1862, "Many families fled in great haste to Milwaukee. Others, among them also members of our church (David's Star, Kirchhayn) left house and home an ought refuge whereever possible. Most of the people, however, fled to our church building, surrounded the church with guards, and stayed in its shelter and protection. Already it was rumored that Cedarburg had gone up in flames! Great was the joy, great also the consternation and shame when the people realized that the threatened Indian uprising only came from some ill-informed mind." (54) In contrast, other congregations thought this event was less noteworthy, as the history of Trinity congregation of Freistadt also points out, "The Civil war period is hardly noticeable in the annals of the congregation." (55) Yet considering how widespread the Indian scare was, most congregations were undoubtedly affected to one degree or another. Even if there was not a general panic among the members of all the congegations of Wisconsin, the threat of war with the Indians in the perilous times of the Civil was had to be at least in the back of everyone's minds. This threat surely lessened the Lutheran layman's zeal and eagerness to lend his financial support to any Indian mission, especially when money ws so hard to

come by anyway.

The problem of Indian revolts was to continue sporadically until 1891. The war with the Sioux in Minnesota, whcih started in 1862, culminated with Custer's last stand in 1876. It was only after the time of the Civil war that the government was able once again to address the Indian problems. Only then did it again have the means available to calm the potential uprisings, to protect the settlers and missionaries. In fact, the government actively began to support missionaries as a part of its overall plan to civilize te Indians. and thus keep them from rebellion. "During the two term presidency of Grant (1869-1877) the federal government....adopted a kindlier policy toward its wards (the Indians) by striving to educate them and make farmers of them. Christian mission among them now was a logical development and looked upon ith favor." (56)

The end of the war, the calming of the Indian uprisings and the further organization and development of the synods all combined to renew intrest of missionary efforts among the Indians. The Norwegian Synod started the Bethany mission among the Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin in 1884. The Eielsen Synod began a mission among the Pottawatomies of Wisconsin in the same year. The United Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church started a mission among the Cherokee in Oklahoma in 1892. The Missouri Synod began a mission among ahe Stockbridge Indians in Shawno Wisconsin in 1899. (57) The Augustana Synod resolved in 1875 to start a mission among the Delaware Indians. This effort was aborted in 1879, however, before any missionary work was ever begun. (58)

The Wisconsin Synod also caught the "Indian mission fever". The Synod's first envoy was Pastor Drewes, who was sent to both the

Indians and unchurched Germans. He was commissioned despite the advise of Pastor Matter of Des Moines, Iowa, who "counseled against undertaking such mission work then (1876) because of mounting Indian unrest." (59) Yet he was commissioned and sent nonetheless with a salary of $500 per year to "aquaint himself with the Indian situation along the Pacific railroad and incidentally do mission work among scattered Germans." But his funds were cut off when he reached California, as "Wisconsin saw no call to reach out to the West Coast, when its own state ws not taken care of." (60)

However, in 1883, Bading formed a committee of five "to look over the existing mission societies for one of the true faith and successfully opperating and lend it our support." (61) None such societies were found. This led to the Wisconsin Synod's taking on the Apache mission in Arizona in 1893. This missionary endeavor continues to exist and flourish at the present time. However, it was only able to be begun after the warlike Apache Indians were quieted in 1886 with the death of their leader Gerronomo. It also was begun only after the Wisconsin Synod had established itself and organized more completely.

In conclusion then, it seems as if the Battle of Cedarburg had only a limited effect on the mission mindedness of Wisconsin Lutherans and on the efforts of their respective synods. Even if the Indians had been completely passive, mission work among them would have been severly limited because of manpower shortages (of missionaries), the financial limitations of the synods, the great need for evangelizing newly arriving immigrants, the fact that the synods were fairly new and in the process of organizing and the cultural barrier that existed. Yet at the same time, the Battle of

Cedarburg did have an impact upont the thinking of the residents of Wisconsin. It helped to foster and reinforce the mistrust that had always existed between white settlers and the Indians. It intensified the white's fear of Indian rebellion. Thus it would seem hen that it was all of these factors working together that was the cause of the lack of mission work among the Indians of Wisconsin. Of these factors, the Battle of Cedarburg was perhaps a cause lesser in importance than some of the others. Nevertheless, it seems that the role it played was to be merely one more example of the fear and mistrust that existed in the 1860's.



Map 11. Population and Railroad Development, 1860. Each dot on the map represents 25 rural people localized by civil townships. The location of approximately 7,000 Indians of northern Wisconsin is not shown. In the 1860 census the total population of the state was given as 775,881, of which 14.4 percent was urban (in population centers of 2,500 or more). The dashed line drawn represents railroads built before 1860. Population map by Guy-Harold Smith. Reprinted from *The Geographical Review*, vol. 18, 1928. Railroad statistics incorporated in the *Wisconsin Regional Plan Report*, 1934.

APPENDIX 2

The following is an eyewitness account of the events in Cedarburg in 1862, originally written by Rev. Robert Graetz, pastor of Trinity Lutheran church at the time: "We had just finished our evening meal on September 3, when a man came riding into town on horseback, shouting that thousnads of Indians were starting an uprisiong and had sworn to kill all the white settlers in Wisconsin. The Indians were reported to be in Sheboygan, thirty miles away, burning houses and murdering the inhabitants. It was believed that they could be in Cedarburg by three in the morning. The rider was on his way to Milwaukee to summon the aid of soldiers stationed there.

After he had left, the men of the town assembled for a conference. They decided not to flee, but to collect all firearms and take up strategic positions in Cedarburg. Many of the women and children were sent to the mill for greater protection.

Between one and two in the mornign, wagons filled with women and children began to pass through Cedarburg. Men were on foot or on horseback. Some of these people had come twenty-two miles, and they reporte that the Indians had been only two miles from their homes and were burning everything in their pathway.

At three in the morning, Teacher Kuehn and his family came to the parsonage. I comforted the owmen and children with the words of the 124th Psalm. By noon, everyone was more calm. They believed the report might be false, or, if true, that the soldiers would reach Cedarburg before the Indians came. Just then a cr;y went up in the streets that the Indians were only two miles away and had set fire to the Catholic church. Farm people, who were now fleeing into

Cedarburg, had seen great clouds of smoke. Many from Cedarburg now started for Milwaukee, and we decided that if our neighbors left, we would go with them in their wagon.

We learned that several babies had been born prematurely on the flight to Milwaukee. Two thousand wagons filled the streets of that city, and the friendly Indians living there had fled. The entire day of September 4 was filled with terror. To add to the misery of the refugees, rain fell in torrents. No one had seen any unfriendly Indians, yet the inhabitants of five or six counties were fleeing before them.

On the morning of September 5, two companies of soldiers came from Milwaukee. They were given the best accommodations Cedarburg had to offer. Two were quartered with us--a 57 year old man with a long w;ite beard, who was a doctor of philosophy named Franz Joseph Felsecker from Bamberg, Germany, and a young man, Peter Divorschek, from Neuhaus, Austria. In the afternoon I called on a sick man who had been left helpless and alone hen everyone in his family had fled to Milwaukee. People are now beginning to return to their homes.

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